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Nicholas Hooper* The Phenomenology of Medico-Legal
Causation
The language of counterfactual causation employed from the bench obscures the
analytical vacuity of the "but for" test. This paper takes issue with the consistent
recourse to "common sense" as a methodological tool for determining the deeply
complex issue of causality. Despite manifestly empty gestures to, e.g., robust
pragmatism, the current approach imposes the dominant values of the judiciary
in a manner that perpetuates the current distribution of power. Whatever the
merits of counterfactual inquiry, its legal iteration requires judges to construct a
hypothetical narrative about "how things generally happen." This, in turn, impels
a uniquely comprehensive brand of judicial creativity. The results are productively
examined in the context of medical malpractice, where the phenomenological lens
foregrounds the connection between meaningless doctrine and the protection of
the medical elite.
Les 6nonc~s de causes contrefactuelles par les tribunaux masquent la vacuit6
analytique du critbre sauf si. , Lauteur s'insurge contre le recours constant
au < gros bons sens comme outil m~thodologique pour examiner la question
profonddment complexe de causalitd. Malgr6 des gestes manifestement vides
face 4, par exemple, un solide pragmatisme, /'approche actuelle impose les
valeurs dominantes de la magistrature d'une manibre qui perp~tue la rdpartition
du pouvoir. Quel que soit le bien-fond6 de /'enqu~te contrefactuelle, son iteration
juridique exige des juges qu'ils construisent une narration hypoth~tique de << /a
fagon dont les choses se passent habituellement. , Cette narration entraine, 6 son
tour, une cr~ativit6 judiciaire aussi vaste qu'unique. Les r~sultats sont examines
de manibre productive dans le contexte de faute professionnelle mddicale ou
l'objectif ph~nom~nologique met en evidence le lien entre une doctrine sans
fondement et la protection de /'ite mddicale.
* LLM Candidate (2018), Schulich School of Law. This paper won the 2016-2017 JSD Tory
Writing Award. Thanks to Elaine Gibson for her comments and encouragement, and to VaughanBlack
for his thoughtful feedback.
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Introduction
The causal requirement in the law of negligence is far more complex
than it appears. While the notion that liability should arise only when one
causes injury is relatively uncontroversial, there is little consensus on the
exact nature of this relationship. The longstanding doctrinal tradition is, of
course, the "but for" test-an exercise in assuming the truth of something
known to be false-toward a determination of whether, in a world without
the defendant's lapse, the relevant harm still occurs. There are, to be sure,
numerous cases where this approach produces intuitively valid results;
when a negligent driver fatally strikes a pedestrian, the aforementioned
counterfactual method commands general assent. More often, and
particularly in the cases that shape the legal approach to causality, the facts
are not so simple and decision-makers must presume to articulate their
understanding of causal links-at least by implication. This is because, to
date, no litigant (or, indeed, philosopher) has ever presented independent
proof of causation in its active sense. Even in the paradigmatic car crash,
we assume that the observable collision caused the ensuing injuries, but
we do this via deduction rather than particle physics.
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In response to this potentially metaphysical inquiry, the Supreme Court
of Canada preempted the philosophical debates. In a highly influential
decision, it was held that causation does not require deep theorizing from
the bench; rather, it is a matter of "common sense" to be drawn from
experiential inferences.' There is some temptation to sympathize with the
Court here. Certainly, no one expects a judicial distillation of causation
that puts a centuries-old debate to rest, but it is nonetheless alarming that
a highly complex inquiry standing between injured parties and recovery
will be decided on the basis of some form of amorphous intuition.
While the vacuity of this analytical tool provokes some concern, my
central interest is the unstated bias reflected in the judicial recourse to
common sense." Obviously, there is no universal logic that somehow
precedes careful reflection. Instead, these words refer to the dominant
perspective of the world. Deviation from the majoritarian approach is
rendered literally nonsensical. Unfortunately, this is not the only area of
the law marked by this strangely explicit importation of prejudice; it is,
however, a uniquely instructive field of inquiry. Since the legal approach
to causation is exclusively counterfactual, it requires adjudicators to
construct hypothetical narratives. It provides, in other words, a uniquely
comprehensive brand of judicial authorship. When we understand
doctrinal causation as the construction of an experiential narrative, we
must then inquire into the perspective from which the law speaks.
Such an analysis could be undertaken in a generalized manner, but
the medico-legal context provides an important and analytically useful
case study. Its significance lies in the marked lack of success achieved by
plaintiffs in medical malpractice claims. These numbers are alarming and
show no signs of improvement. On the second point, medical negligence
provides an extreme brand of inferential freedom in the causal assessment.
It is an area replete with warring experts and scientific complexity, and the
resultant decisions are rarely accessible enough from a medical standpoint
to garner sustained criticism.
Conceptualizing this doctrine as narrative construction elucidates an
important insight: outcomes can be effectively predetermined by how the
counterfactual is framed. To this end, I will begin by noting the theoretical
bases for the law of causality. This provides necessary background for
understanding the unique malleability that characterizes the "but for" test.
Secondly, a brief discussion of uniquely medical concerns is provided to
locate my central interest within the broader framework of legal causation.
Thereafter, I draw on the work of Duncan Kennedy, among others,
1. Snell v Farrell, [1990] 2 SCR 311, 1990 CanLII 70.
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to employ a distinctly phenomenological lens to the problem of causal
narrative construction. This facilitates a uniquely granular focus on the
unstated assumptions that frame the subsequent counterfactual examples.
I. Theoretical and jurisprudential foundations
1. Hume, counterfactuals, and epistemic frustration
In the opening paragraphs of The Philosophy of Tort Law, Izhak Englard
submits that moral responsibility and social utility form "the foundation
of tortious liability, and in the conception of a number of scholars they
constitute an antinomy." 2 While the relative supremacy of each abstract
justification is the subject ofconsiderable debate,3 both narratives depend, at
least in part, on the doctrine of causation. If, as Richard Markovits contends,
there are "positive moral obligations of the members of and participants
in a liberal, rights-based society to prevent others from suffering losses,"
then this ethical framework (which is broadly deontological in nature)
is largely defined by consequences. Social responsibility in this context
seeks to prevent wrongful loss; the morality of tort law is concerned with
acts or omissions to the extent that they cause such harm.
Conversely, if the rules of liability are directed at economic efficiency
or some other normative benefit, causation provides significant definitional
content. Although certain threshold exceptions exist, the conduct targeted
by tort law is, once more, defined by its causal relationship with actionable
harm. Indeed, the centrality of causation in this area has animated a
sustained critique of the law of negligence: If two people suffer identical
harm, their needs are theoretically equal, but their ability to recover depends
on the damage being caused by tortious means. Whether the ideational
underpinnings of tort law are understood as ethical or utilitarian, causation
is an uncontroversial means of delineating reprehensible conduct.
2. Jzhak Englard, The Philosophy ofTort Law (Brookfield: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1993)
at 7.
3. For general discussion, see: David Owen, Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995); Mark Reiff, "No Such Thing as Accident: Rethinking the Relation Between
Causal and Moral Responsibility" (2015) 28:2 Can JL & Jur 371; and William Rowe, "Responsibility,
Agent-Causation, and Freedom: An Eighteenth-Century View" (1991) 101:2 Ethics 237. The general
critical ambivalence is, however, particularly well stated by Stephen Perry: "[T]here is no single
criterion of distribution, such as a particular conception of fault, that can be applied in a uniform way
in all cases. Rather the inquiry is an open-ended one: it is possible to take many different factors into
consideration" ("Loss, Agency, and Responsibility for Outcomes: Three Conceptions of Corrective
Justice" in Ken Cooper-Stephenson & Elaine Gibson, eds, Tort Theory (North York: Captus Press,
1993) 24 at 47).
4. Richard Markovits, "Liberalism and Tort Law: On the Content of the Corrective-Justice-
Securing Tort Law of a Liberal, Rights-Based Society" (2006) 2006:2 U Ill L Rev 243 at 248-249.
5. Alan Harel & Assaf Jacob, "An Economic Rationale for the Legal Treatment of Omissions in
Tort Law: The Principle of Salience" (2002) 3:2 Theor Inq L 413 at 415.
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The general assent that attends this causal emphasis can be usefully
contrasted with the analytical difficulties that follow. As with any area of
the law, one hardly expects judicial citations of philosophical discourse-
and, yet, asserting that "X caused Y" is clearly evocative of a centuries-old
debate dating back to ancient Greece. Accordingly, whether or not this
element of negligence is expressly situated within a given critical context,
it must necessarily take a (contested) position. Causation, in other words,
is a loaded term; a decision-maker can only hold that such a relationship
exists by accepting one definition as true. The law is, however, at pains
to divest itself of any deep theorizing; our longstanding approach is well
stated by Allen Linden and Bruce Feldthusen:
The defendant's conduct must cause the plaintiff's loss or else there is
no liability... .The most commonly employed technique for detennining
causation-in-fact is the "but for" test, whereby if the accident would not
have occurred but for the defendant's negligence, this conduct is a cause
of the injury.6
This approach-the counterfactual method of determining causation-
is ostensibly straightforward. It is not, the courts submit, an exercise
in empirical diagnostics but rather the operation of "common sense
inference[s]."' Moreover, the legal determination is a paradigmatically
binary exercise, asking the trier of fact to decide, on a balance of
probabilities, whether the defendant's negligence caused the relevant
harm. This is a question of fact,' and it requires the decision-maker to
assess the proffered evidence for whether the plaintiff has discharged their
burden of proof.9 Although these choices find virtually no justification
in the relevant jurisprudence, they constitute a self-enclosed system for
approaching a highly theoretical inquiry. Amidst this judicial silence, it is
instructive to consider the unstated foundations of legal causation, which
elucidates the necessarily political perspective from which the law speaks.
Although the law of causation explicitly eschews "scientific precision,"
it maintains a latent debt to the work of David Hume-an attribution that
has been a hallmark of relevant scholarship while remaining unstated in
the case law.10 The conclusions to be drawn from his work are the subject
6. Halsbury's Laws of Canada, Negligence, "Requisite Elements: Causation" (11.3.(1)) at HNE-6.
7. Zsoldos v Canadian Pacific Railway Co, 2009 ONCA 55 at para 52, [2009] OJ No 231.
8. See, e.g., Wiens v Serene Lea Farms Ltd, 2001 BCCA 739 at para 14, [2001] BCJ No 2719.
9. The general rule is concisely stated in Zefferino v Meloche Monnex Insurance Co, 2013 ONCA
127 at para 7, [2013] OJ No 870. The possibility of shifting burdens of proof is relevant to the broader
discussion of this paper, but is an exception to the general rule. It is discussed at length below.
10. For a concise account, see: SL Porter, "The Measure of Damages in Contract and Tort" (1934)
5:3 Cambridge LJ 176.
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of ongoing disagreement, but few would argue against the general premise
that, for Hume, we can never observe causation. Instead, we assert a
causal relationship based on experience. If X and Y are noted together
often enough, we begin to say, "X causes Y."" While this approach is best
described as a "regularity analysis,"1 2 it does not preclude-and, in many
ways, it supports-a counterfactual method of inquiry.1 3 To return more
explicitly to the legal sphere, proof of causation is largely oxymoronic;
we are relegated to inference drawing because of the epistemic problem
presented by causality. It is difficult to applaud the judicial insistence
upon "common sense" as an analytical tool, but an understanding of this
philosophical basis is important for a balanced critique of the current
method. If we accept the Humean model of causation, any incredulity
directed at the normative and overtly anti-intellectual character of
common sense" is mitigated by the lack of an obvious alternative.
A critical reading of the "but for" test demonstrates the practical
significance of this theoretical framework. Consider, for instance, the
unfortunately commonplace case of Goodman v. Viljoen, 4 where the
obstetrician-defendant fell below the requisite standard of care in failing to
advise the plaintiff to seek immediate medical attention when she reported
significant fluid loss. At trial, it was accepted that the plaintiff was in
premature labour. She gave birth to twins who developed cerebral palsy.1
After hearing the expert evidence, the Court found that, in essence, delayed
treatment markedly increased the likelihood of diffuse periventricular
leukomalacia ("PVL"). This, in turn, caused the infants' cerebral palsy.1 6
When the causal narrative is rendered as a series of analytical moves, it
bears a striking resemblance to Hume's notion of unknowability: The
defendant's negligence occurred, followed by the diagnoses of PVL.
The expert evidence spoke to the consensus that, in experiential terms,
the second event often follows the first. The same leap is made when we
connect PVL with the relevant harm: the cerebral palsy. This standard
application of the "but for" test does not, in other words, endeavour to
locate causation in its active sense; instead, as Kenneth Abraham notes,
"there is no independent evidence of cause-in-fact... there is evidence
11. See, e.g., Angela Coventry, Hume s Theory of Causation: A Quasi-realist Interpretation (New
York: Continuum, 2006) at 1-6.
12. Anne Jaap Jacobson, "Causality and the Supposed Counterfactual Conditional in Hume's
Enquiry" (1986) 46:3 Analysis 131 at 131.
13. For a concise example of this reading, see: Martin Bunzl, "Humean Counterfactuals" (1982)
20:2 J of the History of Philosophy 171.
14. 2012 ONCA 896, [2012] OJ No 6332.
15. Ibid at para 57.
16. Ibid at para 130.
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resting on the fact that the defendant was (or allegedly was) negligent.""
Since this fact finding process is directed at that which cannot be proved,
it is centrally important to locate the legal mechanisms that give precise
content to the judicial determination of causation.
By its very definition, a counterfactual analysis assumes the truth of
something known to be false; the "but for" test can never be demonstrated
empirically. The doctrinal result is a test "based on inference from
experience of how things generally happen."" Accordingly, the decision-
maker must construct and assess a hypothetical narrative, which centres
on the space left by omitting the negligent act. This, of course, takes place
within a highly artificial analysis. In one of the most famous works on
the subject, the authors posit a potentially tortious fire to illustrate the
demarcation required by legal causation.1 9 We do not, they observe, point
to oxygen as the cause of the damage-although, but for its presence, the
fire would not have ignited.2 0 In part, this is because "the defendant is
liable, even if his or her act alone was not enough to create the injury," 2 1
but a more important question hinges on the malleability of this legal
construct.
As discussed, the scholarly consensus begins and ends with the central
place of causation in the law of negligence; the successful plaintiff must
prove the causal relation that has frustrated efforts toward empirical
assessment for centuries. The legal response can be seen in the proliferation
of concepts such as "common sense" and "inference drawing." Given
the theoretical underpinnings of this concept, such efforts are broadly
necessary; however, the epistemic problems of Humean causation cannot
validly justify an approach that is, at once, amorphous and normative.
Accepting the unknowability of an active cause does, indeed, relegate
our efforts to the realm of inferences, but it then becomes essential to
articulate the perspective from which these inferences are drawn and the
assumptions embodied therein. To this end, an examination of the relevant
jurisprudence is instructive.
2. Robustly pragmatic "common sense"
The historical development of legal causation provides perhaps the clearest
example of its inherent flexibility. While the rules themselves have avoided
explicit reformulation, their application has shifted significantly based on
17. Kenneth Abraham, "Self-Proving Causation" (2013) 99:8 Va L Rev 1811 at 1811.
18. John Fleming, The Law of Torts, 9th ed (North Ryde: LBC Information Services, 1998) at 220.
19. HLAHart & Tony Honore, Causation in the Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) at 11.
20. Ibid.
21. CED 4th (online), Negligence (11.3.(a)) at §30.
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ideologies of adjudication. For instance, judicial concerns surrounding the
volume of cases that failed on causation impelled a liberalized approach
to inference drawing. Fleming, in his 1977 edition of The Law of Torts,
suggested that "as a matter of forensic reality, the dice tend to be rather
heavily loaded against any defendant."22 Again, this preoccupation with
"plaintiff friendly causation" did not alter the formal contours of the
analysis; rather, the response was "incremental," and courts have reaffirmed
"one dominant test for causation that is always available."23 This language
of singularity is, however, largely disingenuous; as discussed above, there
is a great deal of manipulability at play where courts find unobservable
facts via "common sense" inferences.
As this doctrinal expansion continued to flourish into the nineties, some
notable qualifiers were imposed on the "but for" test. Most importantly for
this discussion, the 1990 case of Snell v. Farrell announced the "flexible"
nature of standards and burdens of proof in this context.24 Snell underwent
a procedure to remove a cataract in her eye. One risk, albeit a statistically
small one, involved hemorrhaging caused by the insertion of the needle.
Where this occurs, fairly obvious symptoms manifest and the operation
must be discontinued. Farrell observed one such symptom but completed
the operation, noting that he "would have to hurry." In the end, a nerve
atrophied in the eye, which led to a permanent loss of vision.2 5 The
causation analysis was understandably complex: It was accepted that a
stroke caused the atrophy, and this stroke could have been caused by either
the defendant's negligence or Snell's unrelated health conditions.26 It was,
in other words, exemplary of "a case involving two potential causes of a
plaintiff's injury."2 7
In response, the Supreme Court upheld "an emerging branch of the
law of causation,"28 which derives from the classical English maxim that
"all evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which it was in the
power of one side to have produced."2 9 More specifically, it was held that
a "tactical burden" arises when the defendant's negligence causes risk
within the area of the impugned harm; essentially, an adverse inference
can be drawn in the absence of "positive proof" unless the defendant, who
22. John Fleming, The Law of Torts, 5th ed (Sydney: The Law Book Co, 1977) at 182.
23. Vaughan Black, "The Rise and Fall ofPlaintiff-friendly Causation" (2016) 53:4 Alta L Rev 1013
at 1016 [Black, "Rise and Fall"].
24. Supra note 1 at para 29.
25. Ibid at paras 2-6.
26. Ibid at para 42.
27. Erik Knutsen, "Clarifying Causation in Tort" (2010) 33 Dal LJ 153 at 168.
28. Supra note 1 at para 12.
29. Batch vArcher (1774) 1 Cowp 63 at 65, 98 ER 969.
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is in the best position to adduce relevant evidence, disproves the causal
link.30
While much has been written about this plaintiff-friendly development,
two features of the decision are especially important for this discussion.
First, the Court is adamant about the subsistence of "but for" causation;
the tactical burden is not conceptualized as a significant doctrinal shift
but rather constitutes a "robust and pragmatic" approach to the existing
law. Secondly, and relatedly, Sopinka J.'s judgment exemplifies the
considerable malleability of the counterfactual analysis. In his influential
treatise, Tort Law, Lewis Klar argues that "[w]hile this approach may
produce a pragmatic solution to a plaintiff's dilemma in difficult causation
cases, it does depart from the traditional 'but for' test."31 This argument,
like much of the criticism directed at Snell, misses the larger point.
The amorphous nature of the counterfactual analysis does little to
inspire confidence. Unfortunate, empty phrases like "robust and pragmatic"
have been rightly derided and there are understandable concerns about the
"policyization" of decision making based on "common sense."32 Indeed, it
is almost trite to assert the normative character ofjudicial constructions of
"how things generally happen." My central claim here is that building on
the Snell critique requires a broader focus on the nature of legal causation
itself After all, evidence theory-and our legal system itself-accept a
qualified version of veritism; even if we could empirically prove causation
(at the molecular level, say), it would be inconsistent for triers of fact to
insist on this form of evidence. Instead, as Russell Brown put it (prior to
his appointment to the bench), "though legal fact-finders may seek truth
from the evidence, the most they will find is a likelihood of truth."33 More
specifically, legal causation is an exercise in proof by triangulation: The
negligent act or omission and the impugned harm temporally surround
the relevant causality and are used to draw a necessarily unobservable
inference. This is not to suggest that the artifice of civil proof justifies the
unilateral imposition of judicial will; rather, the unique flexibility of legal
causation should be assessed in this qualified sense. Broadly speaking,
inferential legal reasoning is uncontroversial, but it is difficult to imagine
how one infers anything from the vacuousness of "common sense."
30. Supra note 1 at para 32.
31. Lewis Klar, Tort Law, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2012) at 402-403.
32. Vaughan Black, "The Transformation of Causation in the Supreme Court: Dilution and
'Policyization"' in Todd Archibald & Michael Cochrane, eds, Annual Review of Civil Litigation 2002
(Toronto: Carswell, 2003) at 187.
33. Russell Brown, "The Possibility of 'Inference Causation': Inferring Cause-in-fact and the Nature
of Legal Fact-finding" (2010) 55:1 McGill LJ 1 at 18.
587
588 The Dalhousie Law Journal
As the (unstated) refashioning of "but for" causation in Clements
v Clements makes clear, this approach can justify a considerable range
of outcomes. The jurisprudential trend that began this section-i.e., the
liberalization of causal inferences-employed the same test that has,
decades later, reversed this progressive trajectory and "turn[ed] causation
into a mere fact-finding exercise."34 While the Supreme Court sharply
reversed decades of plaintiff-friendly causation, this change did not
occasion any justificatory remark on the profound scope of this decision.
Policy considerations aside (at least for a moment), it is alarming that
a new conservative regime can be instituted under the same formal
structures that consistently produced opposite results. As discussed above,
the "but for" test does take a position on the nature of causal relations.
Whatever the analytical merits of counterfactuals, there is a clear test in
place for determining whether a potential tortfeasor caused the requisite
harm. Accordingly, the considerable malleability that arises is the product
of judicial application.
There is no shortage of literature detailing the discretionary nature
of causal inferences, but relatively little has been written concerning the
construction of the counterfactual analysis. The comparative exercise
that attends a causal determination-that is, between the impugned event
and a hypothetical situation where the defendant satisfied their standard
of care-requires creativity on the part of the decision-maker. Assessing
"how things generally happen" is not a neutral process; rather, the trier of
fact is required to assert a necessarily speculative narrative with the force
of law. While such recourse to discretion is hardly novel, the "but for" test
impels a uniquely comprehensive brand of judicial supposition. It asks,
in essence, for a constructed narrative that is constrained only by one's
ability to draw inferences from past experience and the circumstances of
the litigation.
II. Constructing medical causality
The notion of causation as self-conscious legal fiction can, of course, be
applied in any area where the tort of negligence is invoked, but medical
malpractice serves as a particularly instructive case study. Although
there is no shortage of epistemic complexity inherent in any causal
determination, this is stretched to extremes when health professionals
allegedly cause compensable harm. Amidst the language of science and
a general proliferation of expert evidence,35 there is a unique malleability
34. Black, "Rise and Fall," supra note 23 at 1026.
35. See, e.g., Suzanne Blackwell & Fred Seymour, "Expert Evidence and Jurors' Views on Expert
Witnesses" (2015) Psychiatry, Psychology & L 1 at 4.
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at play when judges speak to medical causes. This is not to suggest any
natural cohesion in potentially disparate areas; both treatment and medicine
are amorphous concepts that resist inherent content.3 6 This discussion,
however, seeks to elucidate a common problem by focusing on a specific
subset. Accordingly, my focus is the traditional sphere of causal liability
under the doctrinal heading of medical malpractice; that is, I will examine
cases in which a healthcare provider interacts with someone seeking
treatment, where the impugned act or omission is within the scope of the
defendant's occupational duties.3
Much has been written on the marked power imbalance that attends
the doctor-patient relationship,3 8 but this issue is largely unexplored in
the context of legal reasoning. We know that, even when preventable
medical error causes significant harm, "very few legal actions are
commenced, and a majority of plaintiffs who do commence claims are
unsuccessful at receiving any compensation (whether through settlement
or judgment)."39 While there are a number of contributing factors-the
hegemonic power of the Canadian Medical Protective Association, for
instance-the remarkably low rates at which aggrieved patient-plaintiffs
recover suggests more than resource imbalance. A full-scale examination
of the latent biases within adjudication is obviously beyond the scope of
any paper, but the physician-favouring slant in medical negligence can
be usefully unpacked through a careful reading of medico-legal causality.
The "but for" test has been consistently recognized as an onerous hurdle
for anyone seeking to recover in a malpractice suit" and the requirement
that each trier must construct a counterfactual narrative provides perhaps
the most comprehensive account of how judges imagine things "generally
happen" when medical treatment becomes the subject of litigation.
A critique of medico-legal causality is complicated by many of the
factors that render it emblematic of the broader problem. The dubious
utility of partisan expert witnesses-and the blatant privileging of those
with the economic means to hire them-stands in contrast to our apparent
36. See, e.g., Jonathan Herring, Medical Law & Ethics, 5th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012) at 11-17; Samantha King, "OxyContin in Ontario: The Multiple Materialities of Prescription
Painkillers" (2014) 25 Intl J Drug Pol'y 486.
37. Halsbury's Laws of Canada (online), Medical Malpractice, "Health Professionals and
Negligence: Causation" (VI.3) at HMH-260.
38. See, e.g., Fiona Subotsky, Susan Bewley & Michael Crowe, Abuse of the Doctor-Patient
Relationship (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013).
39. Elaine Gibson, "Is It Time to Adopt a No-Fault Scheme to Compensate Injured Patients?" (2016)
47:2 Ottawa L Rev 303 at 310.
40. See, e.g., Lara Khoury, Uncertain Causation in Medical Liability (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2006) at 4-6.
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interest in reaching justifiable conclusions but, again, this is taken to
extremes in medical malpractice. While it is by no means unique, a recent
paper published by Lerners LLP, a large Canadian law firm, illustrates the
true function of adducing expert evidence: "Good expert opinion evidence
and good expert reports do not happen on their own. They require careful
direction and preparation by trial counsel working with the expert to
develop sound expert opinion that will be persuasive and accepted by the
trier of fact."" Where a case turns on highly technical medical phenomena,
the expert will, in effect, provide or rebut the causal inferences-so long
as one can afford to retain them. On this point, it is worth noting that 95%
of Canadian physicians are members of the CMPA, an organization with
an investment portfolio worth nearly four-billion dollars according to their
most recent annual report.42
More generally, the medical context provides an interesting
juxtaposition between legal causation and the language of science.43
Despite the clear permissibility of inference drawing in the wake of Snell,
courts continue to struggle with tactical burdens whenever the experts
stop short of empirical certainty. In cases such as those discussed below,
plaintiffs suffer clear harm from diseases that are not susceptible, as
yet, to positive proof. In effect, burgeoning medical complications with
insufficient scientific attention can preclude recovery where the trier
insists on this form of precision.
Similarly, medico-legal causation is replete with interdependent
variables that are rarely grounded in the decision-maker's experience;
while there may be several moving parts in a traditional counterfactual-
e.g., a multi-vehicle accident-there is perhaps no other area where the
causal links are so irremediably beyond the ordinary scope of judicial
experience. This iteration of the "but for" test mandates a "common sense"
decision on whether the impugned deviation from healthiness (a complex
term that will be discussed at length below) was (1) caused by diseases and
infections brought about by negligence, (2) caused by bodily processes
independent of the negligent treatment, or (3) some combination thereof
Certainly, cases exist where doctors, say, negligently remove a healthy
limb that the plaintiff would have preferred to keep-that is, where the
41. Peter Kryworuk & Tyler Kaczmarczyk, "Effective Use of Experts: Litigating the Medical
Malpractice Claim," online: <www.lerners.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Effective-Use-of-Experts.
pdf> at 7.
42. Canadian Medical Protective Association, CMPA Annual Report, 2015, online: <www.cmpa-
acpm.ca/documents/10179/302124485/16_AnnualReport-e.pdf> at 17.
43. Peter Greenberg, "The Cause of Disease and Illness: Medical Views and Uncertainties" in lan
Freckelton & Danuta Mendelson, eds, Causation in Law & Medicine (Burlington: Ashgate, 2002) 38.
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scientific complexity is minimal-but anything that operates at the level of
privileged medical knowledge vests the decision-maker with considerable
discretion. After all, if we acknowledge the absurdity of judges ruling on
what "generally happens" when, e.g., delayed treatment and antibiotics are
followed by necrotizing fasciitis, we must accept that plaintiffs, appellate
courts, and legal critics will be similarly precluded from full engagement
with the counterfactual.
Understanding the counterfactual assessment as judicial narrative
provides an effective means of overcoming these analytical difficulties.
In a field replete with partisan experts, legal findings on medicine, and
so-called "common sense," there is a consistent slant in the reasoning that
perpetuates the doctor-patient power imbalance. Beyond the importance
of reckoning with an area of law that consistently precludes recovery in
the wake of often catastrophic harm, we are confronted with a uniquely
malleable body of causal inferences. The ideological content of how judges
suspect things "generally happen" is instructively rendered when these
decisions are made in the face of a traditional hierarchy and deductions
beyond the ordinary scope of experience. Accordingly, the deconstructive
process begins with an inquiry into the unstated assumptions that fill the
gaps in "but for" causation-a project that stands in contrast with the
ostensible neutrality that characterizes these counterfactual narratives.
III. The phenomenology of "but for" narration
1. The mechanization ofjudicial discourse
The process of legal decision-making is generally rendered at the level of
found facts and governing law. Consider, for instance, the last dozen-odd
judgments released by our highest court. There are some minor vaniations
in synonymous language, but the analytical headings never change.
Essentially, each decision is organized into the following steps:
1. Introduction
2. Overview of facts, legislation, and procedural history
3. Analysis (i.e., application of legal doctrine/principles to the
aforementioned facts)
4. Conclusion
While this trend toward formulaic drafting may foster accessibility, it
betrays a deeply ingrained methodology. The factual dispute is presented
as a neutral backdrop for the legal analysis that follows; the fact/law binary
is rigid in the second step while collapsing in the third. Certainly, at the
appellate level, there is virtually no discussion of alternative facts and the
resultant tone of dispassionate "truth-telling" is effectively naturalizing.
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Put another way, the systematic application of law to the court-sanctioned
version of events conceals many of the value judgments that are always
uncomfortably at play.
The act ofjudging is presented as independent, impartial, and diligent-
metanarratives that pervade the literature of organizations such as the
Canadian Judicial Council-but institutional actors consistently discuss
adjudication from a great, macrocosmic distance. In a keynote address
given by Supreme Court Justice Rothstein, he assured the audience that,
even amidst ... individual variation, there are shared institutional qualities
that underlie how reasons are produced. ... It is easy to overlook how much
the individual act of judging is shaped by institutional factors."" This
argument, simply stated, suggests that judicial subjectivity is irrelevant
due to the platonic neutrality of legal doctrine; whether or not Justice
Rothstein is sympathetic to a given cause, he will apply the relevant legal
principles to the facts in issue." How could personal biases ever affect
such a mechanical exercise?
Conversely, there is a well-known critical tradition of rejecting-
and perhaps even mocking-such aggrandizement. The legal realists,
for instance, had much to say about the results oriented slant of the
adjudicative process.4 6 More recently, Duncan Kennedy adopted a
radically granular perspective, which he describes as the "phenomenology
of judging." This critical project focuses on the work that is done to
render the broad categories of "fact" and "law" that come together to form
an ostensibly apolitical judgment. As an illustration, Kennedy writes from
the perspective of a hypothetical judge faced with a dilemma: He wants
to deny an employer's injunction against a workers' strike but suspects
(rightly) that available precedent points the other way. This situation
foregrounds the profound malleability of legal reasoning that predates its
official, institutionalized articulation:
Having to work to achieve an outcome is in my view fundamental to the
situation of the judge. It is neither a matter of being bound nor a matter of
being free. Or, you could say that the judge is both free and bound-free
to deploy work in any direction but limited by the pseudo-objectivity of
the rule-as-applied, which he [sic] may or may not be able to overcome."
44. Justice Marshall Rothstein, "The Role of Dissenting and Concurring Reasons in the Supreme
Court of Canada's Charter Jurisprudence" (2010) 27 Nat'l J Const L 1 at 2.
45. See also: Arsenault-Cameronv Prince Edwhard Island, [1999] 3 SCR 851, [1999] SCJ No 75.
46. For a concise summary of this movement, see: Daniel Bodansky, "Legal Realism and its
Discontents" (2015) 28:2 Leiden J Intl L 267.
47. Duncan Kennedy, "Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology" (1986)
36 J Leg Educ 518.
48. Ibid at 522.
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As Kennedy works through this situation, he engages with the various
incidents of constrained discretion; he recognizes, for instance, that
finding facts to support his preferred outcome will do less to advance the
law in a progressive direction than a doctrinal restatement.4 9 Similarly, his
reputation as an impartial adjudicator lends greater force to his ideologically
motivated decisions: he must avoid being seen as radicalized."o Perhaps
most importantly, Kennedy submits that skillfully eliding his political
allegiances affords a much diminished opportunity for appellate review,
but the more forceful his position, the greater its potential precedential
value to those he (secretly) supports. 1
On a more foundational level, the raw materials of judicial discourse
are inherently ideological. This is not to suggest that a discussion of legal
causality is an appropriate venue for a macrocosmic critique of the common
law; rather, in thinking about the unstated processes by which, inter alia,
the causal narrative is produced, it is important to remain mindful of the
conditions that give rise to this construction. Putting aside its possibility
for a moment, an adjudicator without a preferred outcome is still 'spoken'
by his or her language"; the language of legality is perhaps uniquely
replete with normative content.5 2 Further, within this linguistic structure,
the rules of law that ostensibly determine the results "give no reasons for
themselves."5 3 While this is, once more, concerning on a systemic level,
it further complicates the narrative construction of legal causation: The
constituent facts in each counterfactual are rarely undisputed and are
shaped by both doctrine and discretion; neither of which generally receive
justificatory comment. As a result, deconstructing the dominant causal
narrative becomes both more obviously appropriate and far more difficult;
it is the process of parsing for ideology within a system characterized by it.
In this way, the phenomenological approach provides a uniquely
instructive framework. When judicial reasoning is removed from its broad
official categories of facts, laws, and dispositions, a central starting point
becomes clear: What is the perspective from which the unstated work of
legal reasoning is undertaken? Kennedy's granular focus reminds us that
innumerable psychic processes coalesce to inform ajudicial determination
of accepted facts or governing doctrine. The play of this structure is taken
to a further extreme with legal causality, where the adjudicator must
49. Ibid at 526.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Duncan Kennedy, A Critique ofAdjudication (fin de siecle) (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1997) at 134.
53. Ibid at 135.
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render a decision on what generally happens-an inference that is openly
based on (necessarily individualized) past experiences. Accordingly, while
much is written about the flexibility of "but for" causation, a discussion
of its phenomenology takes this malleability as a symptom of the larger
issue: Judges construct these legal fictions from within the elite sphere
of institutional power. There is, then, a common core that underlies
the apparent randomness of this area, which is usefully elucidated by
considering the dominant perspective from which the law speaks.
2. Expertise, adjudication, and the outcome of governing
While legal causality is characterized by profound malleability-the
operation of unobservable counterfactual assessments and vacuous
analytical tools-its effects are not evenly distributed between plaintiffs
and defendants, particularly in the medical malpractice context. Instead,
as numerous authors report, medical professionals enjoy a considerable
statistical advantage when claims proceed to the "but for" test."4 This is not
by virtue of some neutral content embodied in "common sense," however
robust or pragmatic; rather, the legal system perpetuates the current
distribution of authority (i.e., the same structural imbalances that allowed
elite legal actors to assume that power) and, as a result, evinces an ingrown
fondness for traditional hierarchies. It is a regressive force, given that "the
legal universe just reproduces the society around it: most people... rigidly
observe the rituals and guard the prerogatives of their station... while
vigorously denying that the concept of station has any relevance."55 It is
hardly surprising, then, that the doctor-patient relationship maintains its
social ordering when it enters the courtroom.
On a foundational level, the work of Michel Foucault renders the
normative, patriarchal underpinnings of state institutions, which are
hidden in plain view. In a particularly memorable passage detailing the
hegemonic structure of legal authority he writes:
[R]eform was not prepared outside the legal machinery and against all
its representatives; it was prepared, for the most part, from within, ...
on the basis of shared objectives and the power conflicts.... Certainly,
the reformers did not form a majority... but it was a body of lawyers
who outlined its general principles: a power to judge.. which, having
no other functions but to judge, would exercise that power in full. In
short, the power to judge should no longer depend on the innumerable,
discontinuous, sometimes contradictory privileges of sovereignty, but on
the continuously distributed effects ofpublic power.56
54. Gibson, supra note 39.
55. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the
System (New York: New York University Press, 2004) at 53.
56. Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish, 2nd ed, translated by Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage
Books, 1995) at 81 [emphasis added].
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There is significant force in this carefully apportioned legal authority; as
Robert Cover puts it, "[a] judge articulates her understanding of a text,
and as a result, somebody loses [their] freedom, [their] property, [their]
children, even [their] life.""7 When this institutional power is employed in
a causation analysis, the ideological position is effectively obscured: The
circumstances that give rise to adjudication continue to inform microcosmic
acts of legal decision-making, and the privileged position that attends the
judicial function necessarily shapes the experiential inferences that are
available to the judiciary. In other words, we need not assume active malice
toward sympathetic plaintiffs in our phenomenological framework; we
need only accept the relatively uncontroversial statement that one cannot
speak or detect their own ideology. It is therefore important to consider
the underlying interests at stake each time a medical professional defends
against an unfavourable causal link.
This admittedly localized inquiry can also be read in light of
Foucault's understanding of the state-specifically, through his notion
of "govemmentality."" Essentially, he claims that any theory based on
distinct institutional apparatuses misses the point; the government, he
argues, is formally constrained only by the process of governing.5 9 Put
another way, concepts such as expertise and stigma-which are ostensibly
private and uncontrollable-can be harnessed to serve the normative ends
of the dominant state power. When this happens, we are confronted by
governmental force regardless of its institutional iteration. Building on this
idea, Terry Johnson posits a unique symbiosis between the state and the
medical professions. It is axiomatic that, if governing becomes a central
focus, "the institutionalization of expertise in the form of the professions"
has significant potential for furthering state interests.6 0 This, in turn, impels
the "normalization" of the governed subject; once it crosses a certain
threshold of sophistication, governmentality produces individualized self-
regulation.61
In the medical context, we arrive at such reflexive obedience by way of
"established definitions" that delineate the scope of politicized otherness.6 2
It is beyond reasonable dispute that health and disease are socially
57. Robert Cover, "Violence and the Word" (1986) 95 Yale U 1601 at 1601.
58. Michel Foucault, The Birth ofBiopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978-79, translated
by Graham Burchell (London: Picador, 2010) at 13-17.
59. Ibid at 15.
60. Terry Johnson, "Governmentality and the Institutionalization of Expertise" in Terry Johnson,
Gerry Larkin & Mike Saks, eds, Health Professions and the State in Europe (London: Routledge,
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constructed, but this axiom does not fully illuminate the relationship between
medical authority and the governing state; the latter, of course, benefits
greatly from the ostensible neutrality of professionalized healthcare.6 3 In
return, the medical expert "shares in the autonomy of the state" based on
this notion of unified governance through disparate actors.6 4 More broadly,
the medical professional benefits from the full apparatus of the governing
state: The traditional hierarchy that informs their interactions with those
who seek treatment is the culmination of powerful social forces.
This is governmentality at arguably its most pervasive and effective;
the power imbalance is entrenched structurally (through, e.g., the
profession's monopoly on normative healthiness and pain management)
and psychologically (through the archetype ofthe benevolent, authoritative
healthcare practitioner).65 In this way, the intersection of medicine and
legal causality facilitates a sustained critique of the dominant legal
perspective. With few exceptions, the jurisprudence surrounding medical
malpractice presents resource and power imbalances that perpetuate the
current distribution of authority. Injured plaintiffs endeavour to prove
causal links-an epistemic nightmare exacerbated by the scientific
expertise required in most cases-and elite decision-makers construct
hypothetical narratives that are usually protected by the deferent standard
of review for findings of fact. The counterfactual narrative provides a
uniquely stark rendering of the dominant perspective from which the law
speaks; in medico-legal causation, recovery for often catastrophic injuries
is subordinated to the conservative hierarchy that constructs the narrative
in a manner that precludes liability. This is most clearly observed by
considering some notable examples.
IV. Deconstructing the causal narrative: a close reading ofnotable
appellate decisions
Although the "but for" test formally requires judicial speculation that
assumes the truth of something known to be false, the current state of
counterfactual analysis rarely produces linear reasoning. Instead, as
discussed above, the inquiry is generally presented in terms of the
defendant's negligence. We are left with proof of the tortious act or
omission and the subsequent harm. The inferences that are drawn between
these findings of fact are often obscured behind the dubious workings of
63. This bears resemblance to the suggestive function of formalistic judicial reasoning-law is
applied to fact; it is apolitical and impartial.
64. Johnson, supra note 60 at 8.
65. On this latter point, see: David Naylor, "The Canadian Medical Profession: Theoretical and
Historical Background" in Private Practice, Public Payment: Canadian Medicine and the Politics of
Health Insurance (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004) at 8.
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common sense." This is not, however, to suggest that judges refrain from
constructing a full causal narrative based on their (privileged) personal
experience; rather, the critical project is complicated by the general lack of
transparency surrounding the chain of inferences necessary to connect-
or, more commonly, dismiss-the relation between the negligence and
harm.
The fact that the underlying assumptions in medico-legal causation
are left unstated is hardly surprising-indeed, my central argument here
is that, while inferential reasoning is clearly necessary in this area, those
inferences should be rendered more explicitly. Moreover, to expect the
articulation of latent bias is clearly nonsensical. It is important, however,
to note these difficulties at the outset. In this way, the phenomenological
approach is particularly useful: It facilitates a deconstructive reading of
relevant cases beginning with the premise that, as the statistics show, this
area consistently privileges medical professionals.
The following sections discuss several appellate level decisions in
detail. This focus allows for the clearest rendering of the phenomenological
slant at play, but it should not be taken as an assertion that plaintiffs
generally fare better at trial. Instead, our various courts of appeal are
analytically helpful for what they lack: (1) complex and voluminous
disputes about the factual matrix and (2) proximity to those most affected.
Regarding the former, it is hardly novel to submit that the judicial
articulation of "facts" is inherently political, but trial level decisions are
far more susceptible to the nuance that attends conflicting evidence. Put
another way, the initial triers of fact must hear all admissible evidence
and directly engage with points of inconsistency. Their decisions on,
for instance, credibility are necessarily value-laden-which is, itself, an
interesting inquiry-but for the purposes of discussing how fact and law
impel an ostensibly neutral causal analysis, the distance of the appellate
courts is instructive. These judges benefit from an official version of facts
and the resultant decisions exemplify the disappearance of controversy
and subjectivity. Again, the same processes are employed in trial level
decisions but, given the necessarily non-exhaustive scope ofthis discussion,
my critical framework is most productively used in concert with the most
pronounced examples of physician-favouring narrative construction.
Secondly, and relatedly, appellate courts operate at a more overtly
doctrinal level than is generally displayed in trial decisions. Often,
sympathetic plaintiffs are relegated to the textual record presented and
the advocacy of their lawyers and, from a phenomenological standpoint,
it becomes easier to trace the triers' movements from stark, accepted
facts to cold, unbending doctrine. This is not to suggest that plaintiffs
597
598 The Dalhousie Law Journal
generally recover at trial on the basis of sympathy and at the expense of
legal fidelity-quite the opposite-but a focus on appellate jurisprudence
is practically useful for the directness with which the causal narrative is
constructed.
The phenomenological approach to reading causal narratives has
broad implications; if we understand the counterfactual process as the
perpetuation of legal hierarchy through analytical predetermination,
virtually every reported decision in this area is relevant. In an effort to
demonstrate the utility of this theoretical framework for deconstructing
medico-legal causality, I will focus exclusively on two common tropes
of denying legal causation: the fluctuating demands of specificity that
immunize medical authority and further the professional monopoly on
expertise, and the process of presenting "common sense" and expert
evidence as parallel plotlines to elide the need for justification. There are,
of course, dozens more that could be claimed; however, this discussion
seeks only to present emblematic-and far from exhaustive-occurrences
of slanted reasoning that can be elucidated through a phenomenological
inquiry.
1. The language ofspecificity and professionalized power
The narrative construction performed in Aristorenas v. Comcare Health
Services is particularly instructive given the parallel reasoning displayed
in the majority and dissenting decisions.6 6 In this case, the plaintiff-who
is described as "a 28-year old single parent [with] a four-year old child"
at the time of the alleged negligence67-gave birth to her second child
via Caesarean section. Thereafter, she was placed on an antibiotic and
received homecare based on the "escalating deterioration of the condition
of the wound."6 8 After a few days, Aristorenas presented at the defendant-
physician's office with recommendations from her homecare nurses,
suggesting that further action was required for the wound to heal; she
was prescribed the same antibiotic with an increase in wound-dressing
frequency.6 9 Later that day, and after returning home, she was hospitalized;
she had developed a life-threatening infection, necrotizing fasciitis, which
required three separate surgeries.70 At trial, it was held that both the doctor
and the nurses had breached their standards of care by failing to notice
the inefficacy of their treatment and the likely result of leaving a post-
66. [2006] OJ No 4039, 151 ACWS (3d) 1161.
67. Ibid at para 5.
68. Ibid at para 10.
69. Ibid at para 12.
70. Ibid at para 16.
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operative wound in that condition. This form of negligence irrefutably
increases the likelihood of contracting an infection.
While Aristorenas was successful at trial, the Court of Appeal
overturned that decision on the basis of causation. Despite overwhelming
evidence that the impugned acts created a fertile environment for infections,
the majority found no evidence by which to infer that necrotizing fasciitis
in particular was caused by the defendants' negligence. Instead, the Court
favoured evidence adduced by the defendants to the effect that no one
knows the precise cause of this particular infection and there is certainly
no available evidence on the interplay between this specific delay and
the necrotizing fasciitis. This stands in stark contrast to the refreshingly
transparent causal analysis in the trial decision:
1. an infected wound left untreated will develop serious complications;
2. one possible complication, albeit rare, of an infected wound is
necrotizing fasciitis;
3. necrotizing fasciitis developed in the plaintiff's infected wound;
4. whether or not necrotizing fasciitis would have otherwise developed
in the plaintiff is not a matter susceptible of scientific proof and none
was led by any of the parties;
5. it developed in this case in the very area of the infected wound which
was permitted to deteriorate due to the defendants' lack of care, and
was discovered at a time proximate to the second debridement.7 '
On the basis of this progression, it was held that Snell permits a positive
inference that "the negligence or delay on the part ofthe defendants allowed
the wound to reach a complicated state and lead to rapid unpredictable
consequences," 7 2 and that causation is thereby satisfied. This view was
endorsed by MacPherson J. in dissent.7 3
Read together, these conflicting judgments demonstrate how the
language of specificity forecloses proof of causation. While this area
of the law is largely characterized by scientifically complex facts, often
raising the question of judicial competence, the crucial disagreement here
is simple: When negligence causes the likelihood of infection, can a trial
judge infer that a specific infection was thereby caused without proof of
more? The answer depends on how the narrative is constructed.
At the outset, the majority concedes that the appropriate test requires
robust pragmatism, but must still "be applied to evidence." 4 While this
presents as axiomatic, it gives way to a subtle critique of Snell, suggesting
71. [2004] OJ No 3647 at para 72, 133 ACWS (3d) 718.
72. Ibid at para 73.
73. Supra note 66 atparas 44-45.
74. Ibid at para 54.
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that the trial judge replaced evidence with inference drawing." Accordingly,
the causal analysis is framed as a reification of conservative, fact-based
pragmatism; the blameworthiness of the defendant-professionals must be
grounded in the factual structure presented in the reasoning. This gives way
to a suggestive tension in the ensuing narrative: The causes of necrotizing
fasciitis are not susceptible to scientific proof-they are functionally
unknowable in this inquiry-but, conversely, the more generalized
proof that is available in response to this mysteriousness is met with
demands for scientific precision. For the majority, "but for" the negligent
delay in treatment, we know nothing; the language of specificity-that
we must know exactly what caused this disease, how it was affected by
this negligent delay-is surrounded by the apparent ephemerality of the
plaintiff's expert evidence.
When one recalls Snell, this presents as exactly the sort of situation in
which to invoke the "tactical burden"; that discussion usefully contrasts
the scientific understanding of causation with the legal burden borne by
the plaintiff.76 However, in noting the analytical moves made outside
the official fact/law categories, it becomes clear that the language of
specificity is assigned to the medical profession; the hierarchical logic
of the counterfactual hypothetical places medicine at the service of the
defendants. Shortly after conceding that necrotizing fasciitis cannot yet
be causally proved, the majonity writes: "The trial judge did not assess
whether this delay caused this complication."" The notion that, in relation
to a healthcare professional, "the patient, by reason of lesser experience,
... is typically in a position of comparative powerlessness"" finds further
expression in the causal narrative that will not turn medical certainty
against its own; the plaintiff is constructed outside of the privileged sphere
of scientific knowledge that is vital to her claim.
The phenomenological approach is similarly helpful in parsing the
narrative offered in Cottrelle v. Gerrard, where the plaintiff lost her leg after
the defendant-physician failed to examine a sore between her toes.79 This
was a clear error because, as a diabetic Indigenous woman who smoked
heavily, Cottrelle was at a markedly high risk of vascular disease-a risk
that can result in gangrenous tissue necessitating amputation." Again, the
trial judge found that the doctor's negligence had caused the relevant harm
75. Ibid.
76. Supra note 1 at para 32.
77. Supra note 66 at para 76.
78. Norberg v Wynrib, [1992] 2 SCR 224 at 279, [1991] SCJ No 107.
79. [2003] OJ No 4194, 126 ACWS (3d) 344.
80. Ibid at para 5.
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and awarded damages, but this was overturned based on insufficiently
precise causal evidence.
As in Aristorenas, the possibility of proving causality here depends
on the specificity with which the narrative is rendered. The trial judge
opted for a generalized assessment: The defendant's failure to examine
allowed the wound to go untreated; but for this omission, gangrene would
have been identified and treatment would have followed. This justified
an inference of causation on the balance of probabilities; there is not, of
course, any available evidence about whether this infection coupled with
this delay caused the amputation to a scientific certainty-though, in the
trial judge's assessment, it probably did."
In contrast, the Court of Appeal employed professionalized language
to move the narrative into the realm of loss of chance doctrine: an area
already recognized for its physician-friendly slant.82 The counterfactual
analysis begins by stating that Cottrelle "lost her leg because of an
infection" without specifying the interplay between the delayed treatment
and the threshold at which amputation becomes necessary.83 This creates
an unclear hypothetical which generalizes the scientific detail before
demanding that precision from the plaintiff-she would have been suffered
from gangrene either way; she needs to prove that this specific delay
necessitated amputation." It should be noted that, on a doctrinal level,
there is nothing to suggest that the plaintiff should benefit from a prima
facie reversed onus; it likely appears eminently reasonable that the Court
of Appeal demands proof of a causal link between the negligent delay
and the amputation. The difficulty, however, lies in the shifting degrees of
precision embodied in the narrative. For the trial judge, there was enough
evidence to justify a positive causal inference: The advanced state of the
infection caused the harm; this advanced state was likely caused by the
defendant's failure to treat." This robust pragmatism hardly requires any
doctrinal overhaul; rather, this is a paradigmatic case of scientific proof
destroyed by the defendant's negligence, which is conceptually distinct
from loss of chance. Once again, specificity is leveraged by those within
the sphere of privileged medical knowledge, and the analysis that began
with a degree of abstraction-"the infection" is used repeatedly without
denoting its severity or temporal progression-converges upon the specific
delay at issue: a matter not amenable to positive proof
81. Ibid at para 11.
82. See, e.g., S Waddams, "The Valuation of Chances" (1998) 29 Can Bus U 86.
83. Cottrelle v Gerrard, supra note 79 at para 31.
84. Ibid at para 35.
85. Cottrelle v Gerrard [2001] OJ No 5472 at paras 69-70, [2001] OTC 966 (SCJ).
601
602 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Ultimately, the foregoing cases constitute a tiny, but emblematic,
fraction of the case law that conforms to the suggestive power of
professionalized knowledge. The shifting degrees of precision and
the eschewal of inferences when scientific proof is unavailable typify
a phenomenological process that begins with the end in mind. It could
be argued that inconsistent analytical demands in cases like Aristorenas
and Cottrelle are instead symptomatic of the vacuous analytical tools
with which adjudicators approach causation, but a careful reading of
these counterfactual narratives suggests otherwise. When the decision-
maker must accept that the defendant-physician caused an opportunity
for a certain harm to manifest-where they, e.g., cause vulnerability to
infection-and an injury of that type subsequently occurs, the doctrinal
workings of causation, sparse as they are, facilitate a plaintiff favouring
disposition. The decision, then, to preclude recovery by conflating legal
causality with a form of scientific certainty relies on the monopolization
of medical authority within the professions. Put another way, these causal
narratives are constructed to privilege those with specialized knowledge: If
judges refuse to draw an inference in light of unknowable, individualized
specificity, the causal link can never be established. On the surface, these
decisions rehearse the permissive language of Snell-that an adjudicator
may draw an adverse inference or assign a tactical burden-but the
unstated effect of conservative causation is physician immunity. If the
counterfactual is constructed to require extreme specificity regarding
medical processes, the outcome is effectively predetermined.
2. The double plotline: expert evidence and "common sense" inference
drawing
Understanding the counterfactual analysis as narrative construction raises
the general issue of how we read and anticipate this type of information.
Clearly, judges are not the only purveyors of slanted plotlines. While this
is hardly the forum for a discussion of mythos and the human condition, it
is important to remember that, for most hermeneutical scholars, there are
only a few distinct narratives available to us-they are simply retold with
minor variations.8 6 Whether or not one finds the structuralists compelling
on this point, it is difficult to refute the idea that popular narratives have
become familiar to the point of internalization; we do not, in other words,
require a full-scale rendition of, for instance, the revenge plot-we simply
fill in the expected tropes with minimal prompting.
86. See, e.g., Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces, 2nd ed (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1968).
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From a more critical perspective, this has troubling implications.
In their influential Dialectic of Enlightenment, Max Horkheimer and
Theodor Adomo suggest that the "culture industry" advances the aims of
the repressive state through these familiar narrative structures:
What happens at work... can only be escaped from by approximation to it
in one's leisure time. All amusement suffers from this incurable malady.
Pleasure hardens into boredom because, if it is to remain pleasure, it
must not demand any effort and therefore moves rigorously in the worn
grooves of association. No independent thinking must be expected from
the audience: the product prescribes every reaction: not by its natural
structure (which collapses under reflection), but by signals."
This idea that the dominant narratives do not withstand careful scrutiny
is particularly important; it is hardly novel to assert the latent (at best)
normative character of mainstream narration, but Horkheimer and Adorno
point to a key element in the institutional function of stories: they are not
meant to be deconstructed. To this end, the work of David Bordwell, a
prolific film critic, is instructive. Specifically, his writing on the "double
plotline"-the notion that interweaving thematic elements distracts the
viewer/reader from unresolved tension or illogic-is particularly apposite
in the context of counterfactual hypotheticals.
Consider, for instance, Anderson v McAndrew, where a perfunctory
analysis is sufficient to hold that "the inference sought by Anderson
does not necessarily equate with common sense."" While it is sadly
unremarkable for a causal link to fail on such amorphous grounds, this
decision arrives here in a significant way-by valorizing an apparent
interplay between expert evidence and "common sense."8 9 This case
is notable for its treatment of medical complications well outside of
professional intervention. Anderson is not a medical malpractice case;
however, in determining whether a car accident caused a stroke over two
years later, the Court provides an explicit starting point for understanding
the double plotline of expertise and "common sense."
In the words of Ritter J.A., issuing an oral decision for the Court, there
was an unimpeachable finding at trial to the effect that "the respondents'
expert's knowledge and experience... meshed with the 'common sense'
conclusion that it was improbable that a stroke that had occurred two and
87. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (Palo Alto: Stanford
University Press, 2007) at 109.
88. 2005 ABCA 270 at para 7, 2005 CarswellAlta 1093.
89. Ibid at para 3.
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one-half years after an accident was caused by the accident."9 0 Returning
briefly to the remarks of the trial judge, two things become immediately
apparent. First, the causal analysis quickly becomes preoccupied with
temporal distance; "common sense" can relate physical trauma to an
immediate stroke, but to do so aftertwo years is improperly "speculative."9 1
Secondly, the trial judge bolsters his use of "common sense" with a cascade
of block quotations from classical decisions-nearly a dozen in total-
thereby explicitly adopting an anti-intellectual mode of analysis. Taken
together, we are left with a seemingly crude instrument for determining
causation: The "common sense" of causal relations must be obvious and
careful reflection is barred. This has interesting implications on appeal,
where this stance is read in light of the recorded expert testimony.
As is perhaps obvious, the foregoing means of determining causation
is nonsensical. Its refusal to critically engage with the process of deduction
functionally immunizes defendants when their negligence causes harm in
ways that are not profoundly apparent. This is where the Court ofAppeal's
finding that expert evidence "meshed" with vacuous "common sense" is
instructive: The emptiness of the current use of the "but for" test is filled in
by the proffered expert evidence. From a phenomenological standpoint, the
dualistic presence of experts and "common sense" are used to distract and
justify when decisions are made on the basis of entrenched hierarchies. If
there is no fixed content or constraint surrounding the judicial creation of
counterfactual narratives, this facilitates a tremendous scope for deference
to partisan experts, which has particularly insidious effects in the medical
malpractice context.
In this way, the case of Fisher v. Atack, where plaintiff favouring
inferences were overturned on appeal, is particularly instructive.92 At trial,
it was determined that the hospital's negligent procedure for intermittent
monitoring of fetal heartbeats led to the infant's partial asphyxia which,
in turn, caused her cerebral palsy. This necessitated a series of undeniably
"robust" inferences, performed in light of expert evidence that was, of
course, contested. The trial judge made findings of fact that (1) if the
standard of care had been met, the bradycardia would have been detected
in a timely fashion, (2) that the nurses would have then summoned
assistance, and (3) that this would have led to an expedited delivery
process that would have mitigated the harm.9 3 In the Court of Appeal's
90. Ibid [emphasis added].
91. 2003 ABQB 13 at para 65, [2003] AJ No 24.
92. 2008 ONCA759, [2008] OJ No 4481.
93. Ibidatpara6l.
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opinion, the deference owed to the initial trier on questions of fact is
(at least implicitly) subordinate to the opinions of medical experts. The
plaintiff friendly finding of causation had clearly arisen from "common
sense" and deductive reasoning, but such an approach can only be used to
"draw reasonable inferences concerning the issue of ultimate causation,
particularly in a case involving complex medical evidence."9 4 Ultimately,
divergence from medical authority is presented here as a reviewable error.
A similar approach is adopted in Nelson v. Provincial Health Services
Authority where, once more, a positive finding of causation against
healthcare professionals was sent back for a new trial.9 5 Here, the causal
link between the negligent placement of the plaintiff's foot on a "birthing
bar" and a tear in her hip cartilage became the subject of expert contention.
After consideration, the trial judge endorsed the causal theory put forth
by the plaintiff favouring medical expert-his assertion that the negligent
leg placement likely caused the subsequent damage was found as fact.9 6
The Court of Appeal, however, read the competing experts differently and
opted to rebut the causal relationship. In a unanimous decision, Willcock
J.A. found a "manifest error" in the preference of one expert over the other
and declined to render an alternative causal narrative.9 7 Once more, the
overruled reasoning depended on robust pragmatism and, on the facts, the
links between an epidural, a fixed metal bar, and a broken hip seem to
conform to "common sense" as much as anything could. Moreover, the
eschewal of deference in the appellate decision is overt and unapologetic;9 8
these features coalesce to create the impression of a relatively aberrant-
but familiarly defendant friendly-causal analysis.
If, however, we consider the underpinnings of the appellate
counterfactual, a coherent rationale begins to take shape. The double
plotline of "common sense" and expertise serves a fundamentally
hierarchical function. In this case, the two foundational elements work in
concert to justify the preferred outcome: Where the discretion afforded by
common sense" must be impeached, the authority of the expert provides
a convenient locus of apparent objectivity and learned authority. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the counterfactual narrative offered in opposition to that
of the trial judge is incoherent. But for the proved negligence, the harm
cannot be known without recourse to expert testimony; although one such
expert was preferred at trial, neither is accepted as dispositive on appeal.
94. Ibid at para 64.
95. 2017 BCCA 46, [2017] BCJ No 173.
96. Ibid at para 13.
97. Ibid at para 62.
98. Ibid at para 64.
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This logical structure is exclusively destructive, serving to erode causal
links without any potential for a positive finding.
3. On the continued utility ofphenomenological medico-legal causation
Ultimately, the phenomenological framework impels a granular focus on
the discrete analytical moves that deny causal relationships in medical
malpractice. The foregoing examples serve as notable examples of two
broad phenomena; they are not, however, anything like an exhaustive
survey of slanted causal narratives. Instead, the above deconstructive
reading of some relevant appellate judgments is offered as an illustration
of my theoretical lens at work; that is, these cases, like innumerable others,
demonstrate the latent ideological content that erodes medico-legal causal
links by constructing narratives with predetermined outcomes. Both the
language of specificity and the use of double plotlines are distinct judicial
tropes that typify the larger process of "common sense" as an inherently
regressive force.
Conclusion
The current approach to legal causality is inescapably replete with
judicial discretion and imprecise deductive reasoning. While its epistemic
complexities have occupied countless scholars across a wide spectrum of
disciplines, there is no critical consensus on the nature of active causation.
In response, Canadian courts eschew careful reflection and impose
the dominant version of "common sense"-generally with as many
references to robust pragmatism as their decisions can accommodate.
Behind this suggestive image of adjudicative incompetence, the tension
between the theoretical richness of causation and the judicial refusal
to expend intellectual effort betrays an underlying ideological project.
When decisions can be justified on the basis of "common sense", results
are constrained only by one's creative faculties-an assertion pushed to
extremes when the subject of determination is fundamentally unknowable.
As a requisite element to maintain an action in negligence, this
amorphous, normative hurdle stands between every aggrieved plaintiff
and recovery. In the context of medical malpractice, injured patients bear
the burden of proof for unknowable causality, but face the additional
disadvantage surrounding the exclusive nature of medical knowledge and
the power and resource imbalances that inhere within the doctor-patient
relationship. Accordingly, a critical reading of "but for" causation directed
at repudiation of the traditional model is productive, but ultimately
culminates in frustration. Courts should be criticized for the blatant
imposition of normative values in causal determinations, but the epistemic
problems of causality are not amenable to easy solutions. While few would
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argue against the proposition that "the critical project is about disclosure
of ideology, not about the claim to know the truth outside ideology,"9 9 a
full-scale critique of robust pragmatism should, at least ideally, begin to
elucidate some alternative.
There are, of course, compelling arguments for wholesale reform
to tort law, particularly in the area of medical malpractice. Given the
aforementioned complexities, imbalances, and statistical results in this
area-coupled with the general tort critique that the doctrinal categories
of, say, negligence tell us nothing about someone's needs after they suffer
an injury-the argument for a no-fault system is appealing. However, to
the extent that the status quo persists, the more urgent question is the one
that began this discussion; that is, if no one can validly claim to understand
causation in its active sense, it is difficult to advocate for analytical reform
in the absence of an uncontroversial alternative.
It seems unlikely that the epistemic problems that plagued Hume
and his successors will find resolution in legal doctrine, but our reliance
on inference drawing and counterfactuals may ultimately suggest an
interim solution. Barring reform to the longstanding "but for" test, a
more equitable-or at least less malleable-approach lies in the process
of rendering judgment. The judicial performance of counterfactual
determination is currently presented in a manner that obscures the discrete
analytical moves. This, to be sure, is the utility of the phenomenological
approach: It assists in unmasking the assumptions relied upon in the
assessment of how things generally happen. It is possible, however, to
imagine frank engagement with epistemology within the current analytical
structure. In a recent case from the Constitutional Court of South Africa,
Lee v. Minister of Correctional Services, the judges did exactly that: Their
causal analysis began by acknowledging that "[t]his element of liability
is complex and is surrounded by much controversy.""oo Accordingly, the
Court is careful to engage with the value judgments implicit in every choice
of deduction and explicitly "attempt[s] to justify these propositions."10 1
This is not the place for a sustained discussion of each causal link
constructed in Lee; rather, that decision is adduced as ameans of concluding
by looking forward. The foregoing discussion of the phenomenological
approach to reading causality is, in essence, an effort to foreground
that which is left unstated in counterfactual narratives. The reason for
optimism embodied in Lee-and any decision like it-is simply the
99. David Caudill, "LacanianEthics and the Desire for Law" (1995) 16:3 Cardozo L Rev 793 at 793.
100. [2012] ZACC 30 at para 39, [2013] 2 S Afr LR 144.
101. Ibid at para 45.
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reduced utility of this very theoretical framework. While courts continue
to perpetuate the current distribution of authority through the unexamined
bias of "common sense," the critical process of deconstruction remains
important. A preliminary step forward, then, is to insist on the expression
of each inference toward the assertion or rejection of causality. Certainly,
"but for" causation readily facilitates an approach that manifests its
discrete directives; courts simply choose to remain silent on the points
by which they effect proof of causation by triangulation. In this way,
the phenomenological project is actively self-effacing; its adoption will
render it functionally useless, but only once we demand that courts define
the precise contours of their robustly pragmatic "common sense."
